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THE TREND TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
IN US REGULATION OF NANOMATERIALS
Jean Warshaw  Attorney
 The precautionary principle provides a framework for regulating emerging technolo-
gies in general and nanomaterials in particular. It counsels action in the presence of
uncertainties about risk instead of assuming that nanomaterials are safe unless proven haz-
ardous. Nanomaterials are regulated under different statutory programs depending on
whether they are drugs, pesticides or other commercial chemicals. Recent developments
in the regulation of nanomaterials that are not drugs or pesticides have demonstrated a
trend towards application of the precautionary principle. This is a paradigm shift away
from the requirement built into past interpretations of the Toxic Substances Control Act
(“TSCA”) that manufacturing, processing and use of chemical substances cannot be
restricted unless the regulatory authority proves an unreasonable risk. This same para-
digm shift is incorporated into recent legislative proposals to amend TSCA.
Keywords: Precautionary principle, Toxic Substances Control Act, Nanotechnology, Regulation, Law
INTRODUCTION
Like any emerging technology, nanotechnology presents challenges
for regulators because commercialization has outpaced research into its
possible hazards. In the United States, nanotechnology falls within one of
several preexisting statutory schemes that seek to balance risk against
benefits, depending on whether the nanomaterials are used as general
commercial chemicals, drugs, or pesticides. To date there is no unified
set of regulations that governs all manufacture, use and handling of
nanomaterials regardless of their application. There is a strong and
increasing public demand for legislation that is more protective of
human health and the environment than the current version of the Toxic
Substances Control Act (“TSCA”), which is the statute that governs the
manufacture, use, and handling of nanomaterials in products and other
chemical substances that are neither drugs nor pesticides. The precau-
tionary principle is an approach to supplying the framework for
enhanced regulatory oversight of nanotechnology despite the scientific
uncertainty surrounding its risks, and balancing the risks that may be
posed against nanotechnology’s commercial benefits. This article will
explore how the precautionary principle applies to the evolving set of reg-
ulations governing nanotechnology, with a focus on TSCA.
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The precautionary approach would not be based on whether there is
a hormetic or linear dose-response to nanoscale materials. Instead, it
focuses on the degree of scientific uncertainty surrounding the dose-
response. As a consequence, as the hormetic or linear effects of specific
nanomaterials on specific organisms become better understood, the sci-
entific consensus can be used to enable more fine-tuned regulation based
on experimental results rather than the broad policy dictates of the pre-
cautionary principle.
RISK VERSUS BENEFIT IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Environmental disasters almost always result in broad introspection
concerning how to balance the risks of using technologies against the
potential benefits of using those technologies. The April 20, 2010 explo-
sion of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig and ensuing oil spill in the Gulf
of Mexico brought an immediate focus on the regulatory and enforce-
ment activities of the Minerals Management Service, together with the
implication that stronger regulation and enforcement could have avoided
the disaster (GAO 2010b; OIG 2010). Disasters that have prompted statu-
tory and regulatory reevaluation of risk versus benefit of the underlying
activity include the methyl isocyanate release in Bhopal, India in 1984, and
the release of contaminants into the Rhine river in Basel, Switzerland in
1986 (Bertazzi 1999), as well as the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, climate
change, and exposures to bisphenol A and lead paint.
In many ways, it is easier to regulate after an environmental catastro-
phe. The risks and hazards are quantifiable and are no longer remote to
legislators, regulators, and their constituencies. The industries that
caused the problems are vilified and the societal benefits from their func-
tions have a diminished place in the balancing of risks and benefits going
forward. The legislative, regulatory, and enforcement responses seem
clear in retrospect.
In comparison, balancing risks and benefits is more complex for
emerging technologies such as nanotechnology because of the uncer-
tainties presented when commercialization outpaces science’s under-
standing of risk. The risks may seem remote to any particular individual.
What percent of funding should go to research directed towards new
commercial applications, and what percent should go to research on haz-
ards and exposures? If the commercial applications are not forthcoming
then the risk analysis is pointless, and if the materials cannot be handled
safely then the commercial research has less relevance and less direct eco-
nomic benefit, so the commercialization and risk analysis generally pro-
ceed in parallel. As a consequence, emerging technologies usually result
in release into the market of products that are not fully characterized.
Nanotechnology is no exception. There were 1,015 commercial con-
sumer products that may be based on nanotechnology as of August 2009,
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according to the Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies of the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars (Project on Emerging
Nanotechnologies 2010). The scientific understanding of toxicity and
exposure to nanomaterials is limited (GAO 2010a).
At this relatively early stage of nanomaterial commercialization, regu-
lations must be based on generalized principles and approaches to regu-
lating industries where there are uncertainties about hazard, exposure,
and risk. There is a spectrum of principles ranging from the extreme pre-
sumption that all nanomaterials are hazardous until proven safe, to the
opposite extreme that all nanomaterials are safe until proven hazardous.
The precautionary principle is one construct that can guide regula-
tors in this situation. It is often stated as a single definitive statement, but
is in fact a spectrum of approaches that is providing a framework for reg-
ulating nanotechnology. The precautionary principle guides its adher-
ents to reject the assumptions that all substances are safe to use in the
absence of a full characterization, and to formulate a regulatory standard
that acknowledges uncertainty and mandates or encourages some mini-
mum precautions in the face of it.
For the purpose of this discussion, only a cursory definition of nan-
otechnology is necessary. Although there are many competing defini-
tions, one broad formulation of the definition of nanomaterials was
recently stated in a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency presentation
as “[a]n ingredient that contains particles that have been intentionally
produced to have at least one dimension that measures between approx-
imately 1 and 100 nanometers.” Similarly, it is sufficient to note that there
are potential health concerns about exposure to nanomaterials, includ-
ing the possibility that nanoscale particles may pass through cell mem-
branes, be absorbed through skin, and cross the blood brain barrier
(Jordan 2010). There is currently only limited information about the
health risks posed by nanomaterials, and much remains unknown about
their toxicology (DHHS 2009; Iavicoli et al 2010).
WHAT IS THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE?
As introduced above, the precautionary principle is a broad policy
statement that guides regulatory decisions in the face of scientific uncer-
tainty concerning risk. There is no single, accepted statement of the pre-
cautionary principle, and its various formulations lead to very different
regulatory results. Some of the formulations of the precautionary princi-
ple are:
• “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall
be widely applied by States according to their capability. Where there
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific cer-
tainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective meas-
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ures to prevent environmental degradation,” as stated in Principle 15 of
the Rio Declaration, adopted at the 1992 Rio Conference (The United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development 1992). Virtu-
ally the same statement has been adopted elsewhere, including in the
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999.
• The European Union’s (“EU”) Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation,
and Restriction of Chemicals (“REACH”) law is based on “the idea that
industry itself is best placed to ensure that the chemicals it manufac-
tures and puts on the market in the EU do not adversely affect human
health or the environment. This requires that industry has certain
knowledge of the properties of its substances and manages potential
risks.” (EC 2006; REACH 2006).
• Even TSCA, which is the subject of intense current criticism for failing
to adequately protect the U.S. public, professes to apply one version of
the precautionary principle when it states in Section 1 that: “It is the
policy of the United States that -
“(1) adequate data should be developed with respect to the effect of
chemical substances and mixtures on health and the environment
and that the development of such data should be the responsibil-
ity of those who manufacture and those who process such chemi-
cal substances and mixtures;
“(2) adequate authority should exist to regulate chemical substances
and mixtures which present an unreasonable risk of injury to
health or the environment, and to take action with respect to
chemical substances and mixtures which are imminent hazards”
(TSCA § 2(b)).
The Rio Declaration embodies a permissive statement of the precau-
tionary principle because it permits, but does not mandate, risk mitigation
measures. Mandatory statements of the precautionary principle require
risk mitigation in the face of scientific uncertainty and threats of serious
and irreversible damage (Ashford 2007). Under this standard, TSCA on its
surface incorporates a mandatory statement of the precautionary princi-
ple with respect to product bans and restrictions on use, processing, dis-
tribution and disposal because it requires the EPA to promulgate restric-
tions “if the Administrator finds that there is a reasonable basis to con-
clude that the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use or
disposal of a chemical substance or mixture ... presents ... an unreasonable
risk of injury to health or the environment” (TSCA § 6(a)).
The precautionary principle is applicable only when there is scientif-
ic uncertainty. If all the risks and hazards of a particular activity are well
characterized then how protective a society chooses to be is a policy deci-
sion based on myriad other factors. The precautionary principle does not
dictate any particular standard of risk management, but instead supplies
Precautionary Principle in US Nano Regulation
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a policy that either states a preference for, or mandates, risk mitigation
notwithstanding uncertainties about the risks and potential exposures
(Percival 2006).
Scientific uncertainty can be broken down into several categories.
Classical uncertainty is when there is a known probability distribution,
and the uncertainty arises from not knowing which outcome will occur in
each instance. Indeterminacy is when “we know what we don’t know,” and
ignorance is when “we don’t know what we don’t know” (Ashford 2007).
This is the distinction that former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
was making when he spoke of the threats of terrorism by saying “There
are thing [sic] we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That
is to say there are things that we now know we don’t know. But there are
also unknown unknowns. There are things we don’t know we don’t know”
(DOD 2002). He was criticized for this statement; it may be inelegant but
it is fundamentally a correct statement of the three classes of uncertain-
ties (Morris 2010).
Ignorance can be further subdivided into two types: limited ignorance
when the correct questions are clear but have not yet been answered and
as a result a risk is unexpected, and complete ignorance when the correct
questions are inconceivable and the risks are unexpected for that reason.
For example, it would be limited ignorance to refuse to perform a known
test to determine if a risk may be posed, but if the risk itself was previous-
ly unknown people would be completely ignorant of it. Many types of envi-
ronmental regulation encourage limited ignorance because they require
either mitigation or immediate reporting of known hazards, but do not
require an investigation to determine if those hazards are present.
Consequently people may opt to remain ignorant, for example by not test-
ing for the presence of contaminants known to be hazardous.
The precautionary principle can only apply to classical uncertainty,
indeterminacy, and limited ignorance, because in those cases there is sus-
picion of a type of risk that can be identified and mitigated or a clear path
to investigate whether those risks exist. If there is no reason to believe a
material poses risks, that is, in the face of complete ignorance, the pre-
cautionary principle cannot supply a framework to mitigate the risk.
Applying these concepts, regulatory schemes that seek to eliminate all
uncertainty do not embody the precautionary principle. Instead, they
seek to regulate based on a full characterization and understanding of
the substances or activities they regulate, and tend to set a high standard
for public protection. Nanomaterials that are drugs are regulated under
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (“FFDCA”). It does not apply
the precautionary principle to new drugs because it requires anyone who
seeks to introduce a new drug into commerce to file an application for
approval by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) (FFDCA §
355(a)). The FDA can approve a new drug application only if (a) there is
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adequate testing to show whether the drug is safe or not; (b) those tests
show the drug is safe for use; and (c) the FDA does not conclude from
any other sources that there is insufficient information to determine that
the drug is safe for use. The intent of the law is that all types of uncer-
tainty are eliminated. Notwithstanding attempts to eliminate ignorance,
the FFDCA cannot anticipate complete ignorance except to provide for
product recalls when serious adverse events – which should have been
predictable unless there was complete ignorance – occur. Because the
FFDCA’s objective is the elimination of uncertainty in new drug applica-
tions, no nanotechnology-specific regulation is required in order to miti-
gate the scientific uncertainties. As the FDA’s Nanotechnology Task Force
reported, “FDA’s authority over products subject to premarket authoriza-
tion is comprehensive and provides FDA with the ability to obtain
detailed scientific information needed to assess the safety and, as appli-
cable, effectiveness of products, including relevant effects of nanoscale
materials” (FDA 2007).
In contrast, the FFDCA does not seek to eliminate all uncertainty in
setting pesticide tolerances, which are the maximum amounts of pesti-
cides residues that may remain in food. Pesticide tolerances are estab-
lished by the EPA under the FFDCA, as modified by the Food Quality
Protection Act of 1996. At least one court has agreed with the EPA that it
may authorize a tolerance while in a state of partial ignorance. In the case
under consideration the EPA had established a tolerance for three pesti-
cides although developmental neurotoxicity studies had been com-
menced but not yet been completed (Northwest Coalition 2008). The EPA
may only establish a tolerance at a level where “there is a reasonable cer-
tainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide
chemical residue” (FFDCA § 346a (b)). In the case of threshold effects
this standard carries a presumption that “an additional tenfold margin of
safety ... shall be applied for infants and children to take into account
potential pre- and post-natal toxicity and completeness of the data with
respect to exposure and toxicity to infants and children” (id.). This stan-
dard does embody the precautionary principle because it explicitly
acknowledges that there may be potential uncertainties and establishes
the level of risk that is presumptively acceptable.
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN TSCA POLICY AND PRACTICE
When the precautionary principle is incorporated into policy state-
ments, there is still wide latitude for authorizing various levels of risk tak-
ing. If action is mandated, there are regulatory decisions to be made at
each step of determining what precautions to take, when to take them,
and how to implement them (Ashford 2007). Determining the appropri-
ate level of protectiveness is a political decision (Percival 2006).
Precautionary Principle in US Nano Regulation
389
6
Dose-Response: An International Journal, Vol. 10 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 10
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dose_response/vol10/iss3/10
In TSCA, the regulatory decisions and statutory interpretations have
been so biased that the practical effect is an inconsistency between policy
and practice. While the policy statement in TSCA is a variant on the pre-
cautionary principle, the operative portions of the law require a pre-
sumption of safety if risk data is absent, which is a rejection of the pre-
cautionary principle. Two TSCA provisions illustrate this presumption of
safety and consequent rejection of the precautionary principle. In the
first, TSCA divides all chemicals into “new” or “existing” chemicals.
Existing chemicals are on a list maintained by the EPA called the TSCA
Inventory, and all other chemicals are new. Unless the EPA has issued reg-
ulations governing a particular chemical substance, all existing sub-
stances may be used by any person for any purpose without restriction.
Any person who plans on manufacturing, importing or processing a new
chemical must file a Premanufacture Notice (“PMN”) 90 days prior to any
of those activities. The person submitting the PMN must disclose all test
data and health and safety data in its possession, but is not required to
undertake new studies to determine the risks posed by the substance. The
PMN is generally the first notice that the EPA receives that a new chemi-
cal may be introduced into commerce, and the EPA then has several
opportunities to seek additional data on it or restrict its use or handling.
Typically, after the EPA’s 90 day review period the manufacturer, proces-
sor or importer must notify the EPA when its planned activities have com-
menced and then the EPA puts the chemical on the TSCA Inventory, con-
ferring on it the status of an existing chemical. (TSCA § 5).
Most PMNs are submitted with very little data about the chemicals
they describe; a 2003 draft study for the EPA reported that 67% of PMNs
included no test data and 85% included no health data (Battelle 2003).
The PMN rules encourage companies to remain in a state of partial igno-
rance, because if companies generate data tending to show a risk there is
a likelihood that the EPA will seek to restrict the manufacture, use and
handling of that chemical. In the absence of sufficient data to evaluate
health and environmental effect, the EPA does not have authority to
impose restrictions during the PMN process unless the EPA finds that
either the chemical “may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health
or the environment” or it will be made in “substantial quantities” and will
result in substantial exposure to humans or the environment (TSCA §
5(e)). These requirements limit the EPA’s ability to take actions to miti-
gate risks in the face of uncertainty unless the person who submitted the
PMN agrees to a voluntary consent order.
A second example of how TSCA does not incorporate the precaution-
ary principle in practice comes from the statutory requirements for issu-
ing product bans and restrictions. The EPA may ban or restrict manufac-
ture and handling of an existing chemical that is on the Inventory only if
there is “reasonable basis to conclude that the manufacture, processing,
J. Warshaw
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distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of a chemical substance ... pres-
ents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the envi-
ronment” (TSCA § 6). Applying this standard in one of the more notori-
ous and criticized court decisions on TSCA, the court in Corrosion Proof
Fittings stated that “Congress did not enact TSCA as a zero risk statute,”
and struck down regulations banning uses of asbestos on several grounds.
One of those grounds was that the EPA could not have made a valid deter-
mination of the unreasonableness of the risk posed by asbestos products
because the EPA had not borne its burden of balancing the costs and ben-
efits of the asbestos ban (Corrosion Proof Fittings 1991). Therefore, while the
statute embodies a mandatory statement of the precautionary principle
when it requires action if there are unreasonable risks, the interpretation
of what constitutes an unreasonable risk poses high barriers to taking
action to mitigate risk even for a substance such as asbestos which has well
characterized risks and hazards. Notably, portions of the asbestos ban
relating to products that had already been discontinued or had not yet
been commercialized survived the Court’s decision because a cost benefit
analysis applicable to products that are not on the market is meaningless.
As to these banned products, the end result was a protective approach
applying the precautionary principle (Percival 2006).
TSCA’S APPLICATION TO NANOMATERIALS
Nanomaterials are regulated under TSCA in the same manner as all
other chemical substances, and are not currently singled out as a group
for their unique size or properties. This preexisting statutory scheme has
limitations when existing chemicals are reengineered to have novel attrib-
utes. If a chemical substance is on the Inventory, then a nanomaterial
with the same “molecular identity” is defined to be that existing chemical
and the EPA will not currently receive any notice that a new nanomateri-
al will be introduced into commerce. Consequently, there will not be a
premarket opportunity to regulate many nanomaterials.
The EPA issued a position paper stating that a material newly made on
the nanoscale is an existing chemical only if it has the same molecular for-
mula, structural formula, spatial arrangement of atoms and crystal lattice
structure as a chemical already on the Inventory, and also is the same
allotrope and is composed of the same isotopes (USEPA 2008a). EPA also
clarified that each specific carbon nanotube must be on the Inventory, and
industry cannot rely on the Inventory listing for carbon or other nanotubes
to conclude that particular carbon nanotubes are also on the Inventory
(USEPA 2008b). While these statements are likely to encompass a broader
definition of “molecular identity” than permissible under the statute, they
demonstrate the EPA’s resolve to have an opportunity to regulate as many
nanomaterials as possible under the existing statutory program.
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS UNDER TSCA
There are increasing calls for reinvigorated application of the pre-
cautionary principle to chemicals in general and nanomaterials in par-
ticular. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health rec-
ommended the precautionary principle’s application to nanotechnology
when it stated “[u]ntil further information on the possible health risks
and extent of occupational exposure to nanomaterials becomes available,
interim protective measures should be developed and implemented”
(DHHS 2009).
Two parallel developments could ultimately result in application of
the precautionary principle to nanomaterials. In 2010 legislation was
introduced in Congress that would have substantially revised TSCA and
given the EPA far broader authority to take action to mitigate risks from
chemicals in general and nanomaterials in particular. Although neither
TSCA reform bill was enacted in 2010, and prospects for formal TSCA
reform appear to be remote in the short term, these legislative efforts
point to the evolution of the precautionary principle in the United States.
Senator Lautenberg and Representatives Rush and Waxman intro-
duced TSCA reform legislation in 2010 (Safe Chemicals Act of 2010; Toxic
Chemicals Safety Act of 2010). Both of these bills would have moved nan-
otechnology regulation away from the precautionary principle and towards
a policy of eliminating all uncertainty, similar to the regulatory system for
new drugs. Both bills recited a policy of requiring that “all chemicals in
commerce meet a risk-based safety standard that protects vulnerable and
affected populations and the environment” and required companies to
“provide sufficient health and environmental information for the chemical
substances which they manufacture, process, or import as a condition of
allowing such companies to distribute such chemicals in commerce.”
Under both of the proposed TSCA bills, the EPA could determine
that a nanomaterial exhibits a “characteristic” that could affect risk, and
consequently categorize it as a new chemical substance even if other
forms of the same chemical are on the Inventory. As in the current ver-
sion of TSCA, new chemical substances would go through a premanufac-
ture notification process, except that the proposals required develop-
ment of a minimum data set to be submitted with the PMN for a new
chemical. The minimum data set is a new concept for TSCA that appears
to be borrowed from REACH’s requirements. The minimum data set
would eliminate the problem that occurs when companies opt to remain
in a state of limited ignorance by failing to perform testing that would
identify risks. As noted above, there are many opportunities to introduce
precautionary concepts into regulation, and the EPA would have to deter-
mine what levels of uncertainty are acceptable in establishing the tests
that would comprise these minimum data sets. A customized minimum
data set could be established for nanomaterials.
J. Warshaw
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In both proposed versions of TSCA, the EPA would prepare a priori-
ty list of no fewer than 300 chemicals for priority evaluation against a safe-
ty standard that incorporates a “reasonable certainty of no harm.” This is
virtually the same language as used in the Food Quality Protection Act of
1996, discussed above with respect to pesticide tolerances. Manufacturers
and processors would have the burden of proving that their chemicals
meet this standard, and if they cannot the EPA could ban or restrict the
chemical. Starting with the chemicals on the priority list, the EPA would
be required to evaluate all uses of commercial chemicals for compliance
with the safety standard. The Senate version added that “reasonable cer-
tainty of no harm” means that there is “negligible risk of any adverse
effect on the general population or a vulnerable population.”
As a practical matter, either proposed version of the TSCA reform bill
would have had to incorporate elements of the precautionary principle
in their implementation, or risk halting most exploitation of nanotech-
nology, which seems unlikely in the current economic predicament. A
standard requiring proof that nanomaterials have a “reasonable certainty
of no harm” or pose “negligible risks” of any adverse effects could be
interpreted similarly to the “reasonable certainty that no harm will result”
in the FFDCA, which does tolerate uncertainty and require action to mit-
igate uncertain risks. A system that seeks to eliminate all uncertainty can-
not be implemented in the short term because of the long lead time for
studies that would establish hazards and exposure, and the limited
resources available to study the risks and exposure pathways for each
potential use of each unique nanomaterial. One study estimated that it
could take more than ten years to thoroughly study all existing nanoma-
terials if companies devoted five percent of their research and develop-
ment funds to the effort (Choi et al. 2009). That study was conducted
before the proposed TSCA reform bills were drafted, and could not take
into account the bills’ requirement to evaluate each potential use of a
chemical separately, which would increase the time and money necessary
for research. Even if the “negligible risk” standard were to be enacted into
law, some degree of uncertainty will have to be tolerated until the
required studies are completed. The precautionary principle comes into
play until the uncertainties are eliminated.
Environmental organizations and industry groups raised the safety
standard and timing of safety determinations as two of the many issues that
require further refinements before these stakeholders can support TSCA
reform (Duvall and Wyatt 2010). These topics are at the crux of the pre-
cautionary principle, and further discussions should focus legislators and
the public on whether the precautionary principle should be embraced.
At the same time as EPA is supporting TSCA reform, it has also made
innovative uses of its existing statutory authority to gather information on
nanomaterials and regulate them, and has announced its intent to take
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more actions in the near future (USEPA 2009a; USEPA 2009b; USEPA
2009c; USEPA 2010). If successful, these actions would reverse the his-
torical presumption that all chemicals are safe unless proven otherwise,
and would implement a presumption that risk mitigation is required for
all nanomaterials. The EPA has issued rules called Significant New Use
Rules for specific nanomaterials, which require the use of respirators and
personal protective equipment, failing which the users must submit a
notification to the EPA on the PMN form with the same data that must be
submitted with a PMN. The EPA has entered into orders with the agree-
ment of companies that submitted PMNs on nanomaterials. Each of these
orders requires the company to perform a 90-day inhalation toxicity study
after temporal or volume triggers have been met, and to provide workers
with respirators and gloves that are impervious to nanoparticles (Gold
and Warshaw 2010). These orders embody the precautionary principle
because they permit the EPA to regulate without first marshalling enough
data to prove that an unreasonable risk is presented.
The EPA has said that it intends to issue a Significant New Use Rule
that applies generally to nanomaterials, a rule requiring companies to sub-
mit to the EPA data and studies in their possession concerning nanoma-
terials, and a rule requiring testing of multi-wall carbon nanotubes and
nanosized clays and alumina under TSCA’s test rule provisions (Jordan
2010; USEPA 2010). All of these actions are cumbersome to implement, as
demonstrated by the fact that the EPA first announced the proposed test
rule for multiwalled carbon nanotubes over eighteen months ago, and the
proposed reporting requirements in December 2009 (USEPA 2009a;
USEPA 2009c) and has not formally proposed them to date. Once these
rules are formally proposed the public will have an opportunity to com-
ment before any final rules go into effect. While the contemplated test
rule and reporting rule would tend to decrease the scientific uncertainty
concerning the risks of nanomaterials, the Significant New Use Rules pro-
posed and issued to date are classical applications of the precautionary
principle’s injunction to take action notwithstanding uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
Chemical regulation in the United States is moving away from a pre-
sumption that risks do not warrant mitigation until they have been
proven either by a disaster on the scale of the Gulf of Mexico oil spill or
incontestable scientific proof. For emerging technologies such as nan-
otechnology US legislators and regulators are gradually embracing the
precautionary principle’s admonition that uncertainties should not pre-
clude effective protections. Whether nanotechnology regulation arrives
at the precautionary principle through legislative revision of the Toxic
Substances Control Act, or through creative use of the regulatory options
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available to the EPA under the current law is of less consequence than the
fact that this paradigm shift is taking place at all.
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